How does off-farm work participation of farm couples affect household land transfer choices? An empirical investigation by Zhou, Xiaoshi et al.
 
How does off-farm work participation of farm couples affect 










Department of Global Value Chains and Trade, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, 




Department of Global Value Chains and Trade, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, 




College of Economics & Management, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, 
China; 




Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the 63rd AARES Annual Conference, 
Melbourne, Vic 12-15 February 2019 
 
 
Copyright 2018 by Xiaoshi Zhou, Wanglin Ma, Alan Renwick and Gucheng Li. All rights 
reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes 
by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
1 
How does off-farm work participation of farm couples affect household land transfer 
choices? An empirical investigation 
Abstract 
Off-farm work plays a significant role in diversifying rural income and reducing risks generated 
from relying solely on agricultural production. Prior studies have examined the association 
between off-farm work participation and land use behaviors of rural households, but little 
attention has been paid to the effects of the joint off-farm work decisions of farm couples on 
land transfer choices. To bridge this gap, this study investigates the determinants of farm 
couples’ off-farm work participation, using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression 
model and survey data collected from Hubei province of China. We also estimate the impact of 
the joint off-farm work decisions of farm couples on land transfer choices by employing a 
multinomial logit model and controlling for the endogeneity issues of off-farm work variables. 
The empirical results show that farm couples are jointly making decisions to work off the farm, 
but their decisions affect household land transfer choices differently. In particular, we show that 
the husbands participating in the off-farm work are more likely to rent in land, while their wives 
are less likely to do so. Both the husbands and wives are more likely to rent out land if they 
work off the farm. Our findings highlight the importance of farm couples’ off-farm work 
decisions in stimulating the development of rural land rental markets. 
Keywords: Off-farm work; Farm couples; Land transfer choices; SUBP; MNL; Rural China 
JEL codes: C83; R14; R23; 
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1. Introduction 
Off-farm work by farmers has been a persistent phenomenon in both developed and developing 
countries. For example, in 2010 it was estimated that about 91% of the farm households have 
at least one family member working off the farm in the United States (Brown and Weber, 2013). 
In China, there is an overall upward trend towards off-farm work participation by rural labors 
in the past four decades, and the ratio of off-farm work participants to rural labors has increased 
from 9.3% in 1978 to 74.9% in 2015 (Zhang et al., 2018). 
A large body of literature has analyzed the determinants of off-farm work participation and 
its impacts on such aspects as farm productivity and efficiency, new technology adoption, 
household income, poverty reduction, food expenditure and food security (Ma et al., 2018c, 
2018b; Mishra et al., 2015; Owusu et al., 2011; Su et al., 2016). Most of them have focused on 
the off-farm work participation decision of household heads (usually males), due to the belief 
that they dominate household decision-making. For example, Imai et al. (2015) showed that 
household heads’ participation in off-farm work and occupation choice are affected by wealth, 
human capital, and social group. In their investigation of rural China, Ma et al. (2018b) found 
that off-farm work participation of household heads (86% of which were male) significantly 
increases expenditures on productivity-enhancing inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.  
Several studies have also investigated the joint off-farm work participation decisions of 
farm couples, and found that the husbands and wives are making off-farm work decisions 
jointly (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Chang et al., 2017; Chang and Yen, 2010; El-Osta et al., 
2008; Kimhi and Lee, 1996). For example, Abdulai and Delgado (1999) revealed that off-farm 
work participation of husbands and wives are nonindependent of one another. Compared with 
farm work, off-farm work enables the female or the wives to improve their well-being, support 
their financial leverage in the household and reduce food insecurity (Dzanku, 2019; Van den 
Broeck and Maertens, 2017). In addition, the female or the wives’ participation in off-farm 
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work may generate different consequences compared to that of the male or the husbands. El-
Osta et al. (2008) examined the impacts of government payments on off-farm decisions of 
married farm couples, and found that a $10,000 increase in expected government payments 
tends to increase the likelihood of the wives working off the farm alone by 9.0% and to decrease 
such likelihood by 8.6% significantly for the strategy where both the husbands and the wives 
work concurrently off the farm. Chang et al. (2017) showed that compared to farm families in 
which solely the husbands engaged in off-farm activities, those in which only the wives 
participated in off-farm work have a lower propensity to engage in direct marketing in Taiwan.  
Some studies have investigated the linkage between off-farm work participation and land 
transfer choices (Huang et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2018; Kung, 2002; Min et al., 2017; Yan and Huo, 
2016). For example, Huang et al. (2012) and Yan and Huo (2016) both examined the nexus 
between off-farm employment and households’ decision of land transfer, and they found that 
households who engaged in off-farm activities are more likely to rent out land in rural China. 
Kung (2002) showed that the household heads who spent more time on off-farm activities tend 
to decrease the amount of land rented in China. This observation is echoed by the study of Ji et 
al. (2018), who showed that rural labor migration has a significant and negative effect on 
households renting in land and has a positive impact on households renting out land in rural 
China. Despite the presence of these findings, it is still not clear whether the off-farm work 
participation of household husbands and wives generate homogenous or heterogeneous impacts 
on the land transfer choices. 
Land rental market participation is an effective way to enhance allocative efficiency and 
agricultural productivity by facilitating transfers of land from less productive households to 
more productive ones (Deininger and Jin, 2005). Lambin and Meyfroidt (2011) emphasized 
that the pathways leading to a land use transition rely on various degrees and combinations of 
off-farm work activities. Given the existed interdependence of farm couples’ off-farm work 
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decisions (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Chang et al., 2017; Chang and Yen, 2010; El-Osta et 
al., 2008), it is quite likely that land transfer choices within a household are affected not only 
by the off-farm work participation of the husbands but also by that of the wives. Understanding 
the linkages between off-farm work participation of farm couples and land transfer choices can 
provide significant information to policy-makers in their efforts to design policy instruments 
that help increase off-farm work opportunities and stimulate the development of rural land 
rental markets. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies that have 
examined how the joint off-farm work participation decisions of the farm couples affect 
household land transfer choices. 
The primary objective of this study is, therefore, to analyze the joint impacts of off-farm 
work participation decisions of farm couples on household land transfer choices using data 
collected from rural households in Hubei province of China in 2018. The contribution of this 
study to the literature on rural migration and land transfer is threefold. First, we analyze the 
factors that affect husbands and wives’ decisions to participate in off-farm work, using a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. This model enables us to identify whether the off-
farm work decisions of farm couples are jointly made through unobserved factors (e.g., farmers’ 
innate abilities and motivations to work outsides). Second, we estimate the impact of off-farm 
work participation of farm couples on land transfer choices (i.e. no land transfer, renting-in land, 
and renting-out land) simultaneously by using a multinomial logit model. Third, we provide a 
theoretical framework that relates the off-farm work decisions of farm couples to land transfer 
choices.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. 
The empirical strategies are introduced in Section 3. The data and descriptive statistics are 
presented in Section 4 and the estimated results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes 
with policy implications. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework employed in the present study assumes that a household consists of 
one husband and one wife who have fixed time endowments, which can be allocated to leisure, 
farm production, and off-farm work activities. Given this assumption and following previous 
studies (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Ma et al., 2018b), the simplified utility of the household 
can be expressed as a function of goods and services consumed and leisure time: 
𝑈 = (𝐶, 𝐿1, 𝐿2; 𝐴) (1) 
where U is a household utility function, which is assumed to be monotone increasing in its 
arguments, strictly concave, and to possess continuous second partial derivatives; C denotes a 
set of goods or services purchased for consumption; 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 represent leisure time used by 
the husband and his wife, respectively; A represents a vector of socio-demographic 
characteristics (e.g., age, education and household size) that affect household’s utility. Utility 
maximization is subject to a time constraint, income constraint and technology constraint. In 
particular, the time constraint is expressed as follows: 
𝑇 = 𝑇𝑖1 + 𝑇𝑖2 + 𝐿𝑖   (𝑖 = 1,2) (2) 
where T is the total time available for either the husband or the wife; 𝑇𝑖1  and 𝑇𝑖2  are time 
allocated by the husband (i=1) and the wife (i =2) to farm work and off-farm work, respectively; 
and 𝐿𝑖  is considered the leisure time used by the husband (i =1) and his wife (i =2). Non-
negativity constraints are imposed on farm work and off-farm work of both husbands and wives, 
i.e. 𝑇𝑖1 ≥ 0 and 𝑇𝑖2 ≥ 0  for 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
 Consumption is constrained by household income, which is composed of net farm income, 
income from off-farm work, and income from other sources (i.e. interest, dividends, private 
pensions, and remittances). The resulting income constraint is: 
𝑃𝑐𝐶 = 𝑃𝑄𝑄 − 𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑋𝑋 + ∑ 𝑊𝑖2𝑇𝑖2
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑅 (3) 
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where 𝑃𝑐  and C denote the prices and quantities of goods and services purchased for 
consumption, respectively; 𝑃𝑄  and Q represent the price and quantity of farm output, 
respectively; 𝑃𝐵 and 𝐵 are the price and quantity of farmland, respectively; 𝑃𝑋 and 𝑋 are the 
prices and quantity vectors of farm inputs besides land such as fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, 
respectively; 𝑊12 and 𝑊22 represent off-farm wage rates received by the husband and his wife, 
respectively; 𝑇12 and 𝑇22 capture the time used for off-farm work by the husband (i=1) and his 
wife (i=2), respectively; 𝑅  is the quantity of non-labor income such as private pension, 
remittance and government transfers. 
 The technology constraint can be expressed by a twice differentiable, concave production 
function: 
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝐵, 𝑋, 𝑇11, 𝑇21; 𝑍) (4) 
where 𝑄, 𝐵, 𝑋, 𝑇11 and 𝑇21 are as defined above, and 𝑍 is a vector of exogenous factors that 
shift the production function. 
 As outlined above, the Lagrangian function of the household’s utility-maximization 
problem can be specified, given the constraints specified in Equations (2), (3) and (4). For 
analytical purposes, we substitute Equation (4) into Equation (3). Then, the Lagrangian function 
of the household’s utility maximization problem can be expressed as: 
ℒ = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿1, 𝐿2; 𝐴) + 𝜆(2𝑇 − 𝑇11 − 𝑇12 − 𝐿1 − 𝑇21 − 𝑇22 − 𝐿2) + 𝜂[𝑃𝑄𝑄(𝐵, 𝑋, 𝑇11, 𝑇21;  𝑍)
− 𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑋𝑋 + 𝑊12𝑇12 + 𝑊22𝑇22 + 𝑅 − 𝑃𝐶𝐶] 
(5) 
where 𝜆 refers to the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the time constraints on the work of 
the husband and his wife, while 𝜂 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the household 
income constraint. 
 Under the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, maximization of this Lagrangian function with respect 
to Q, 𝑇𝑖1 and 𝑇𝑖2 yields the optimal choices by the husband and his wife. In particular, the farm 




= −𝜆 + 𝜂𝑃𝑄
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑇𝑖1
= 0 (𝑖 = 1, 2) (6) 
 The off-farm work participation condition of farm couples can be expressed as: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑇𝑖2
= −𝜆 + 𝜂𝑊𝑖2 = 0 (𝑖 = 1, 2) (7) 
 Equations (6) and (7) can be rearranged to obtain the return to labor from the farm and off-
farm work: 
𝑊𝑖2 ≤ 𝜆/𝜂 = 𝑃𝑄𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝑇𝑖1  (𝑖 = 1, 2) (8) 
where 𝜆/𝜂 , with 𝜆 = 𝜕ℒ/𝜕𝑇𝑖  and 𝜂 = 𝜕ℒ/𝜕𝐶 , represents the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption of goods; 𝑃𝑄𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝑇𝑖1 refers to the value of marginal product 
of farm labor for the husband (i=1) or the wife (i=2). In Equation (8), 𝑊𝑖2 < 𝜆/𝜂  (𝑖 = 1, 2) 
(strict inequality) implies that the potential wage rate received by the husband or his wife from 
off-farm work is less than the marginal value of farm work or leisure (i.e. reservation wage). 1 
In this case, the optimal time that farm couples allocated to off-farm work is zero, i.e. 𝑇𝑖2 = 0 
(Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Ma et al., 2017). However, when 𝑊𝑖2 = 𝜆/𝜂 (interior solution), 
an individual’s off-farm wage rate equals the marginal value of his or her leisure or farm work. 
In this case, the optimal time that the husband or his wife used for off-farm work may be positive. 
 Through Lagrangian duality theory, the above derivation of the farm couples’ off-farm 
work participation decisions can be related to the use of agricultural inputs such as land, 
fertilizers, and pesticides, and the farm household production problem can be specified as a 
profit-maximizing problem at the optimal solution (Kousar and Abdulai, 2016; Ma et al., 
2018b). We specify the household’s profit-maximizing problem as follows:   
                                                            
1 The reservation wage for off-farm work is the marginal value of the individual’s time when all of it is allocated 
to either the farm and leisure (Ma et al., 2018b). 
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𝜋 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑃𝑄𝑄 − 𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑋𝑋 + 𝑊12𝑇12 + 𝑊22𝑇22 + 𝑅) (9) 
where 𝜋 is the profit obtained from the farm, off-farm and non-labor activities, and Equation 
(9) is subject to 𝑄 = 𝑄(𝐵, 𝑋, 𝑇11, 𝑇21; 𝑍). From Equation (9), we can specify the maximized 
profit as a function of inputs and output prices, wages from off-farm work, and household and 
farm-level characteristics, as: 
𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑃𝑄, 𝑃𝐵, 𝑃𝑋, 𝑊12, 𝑊22; 𝑍) (10) 
 Direct application of Hotelling’s Lemma to Equation (10) yields the reduced form 
specifications for input demand and output supply functions. Without loss of generality and 
extrapolating the case only to land use, we can obtain the optimal quantity of land used for 
cultivation as follows: 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑃𝐵
= −𝐵 = 𝐵(𝑃𝑄, 𝑃𝐵, 𝑃𝑋, 𝑊12, 𝑊22; 𝑍) (11) 
where 𝐵 represents the land used for agricultural production, and 𝑃𝐵 refers to the land price per 
unit, as defined previously. The specification (11) suggests that the demand for land input is 
influenced by output price, land price, other inputs prices, off-farm work wage rates received 
by the husband and his wife, as well as household and farm-level characteristics. 
Off-farm work participation decisions of farm couples may affect the quantity of land use 
either positively or negatively. On the one hand, the farm couples’ off-farm work participation 
requires the households to re-allocate the labors used for farm work to off-farm work, resulting 
in so-called lost-labor effect (Taylor et al., 2003). In order to maintain agricultural productivity, 
farm households may choose to reduce the quantity of cultivated land by renting out some land. 
On the other hand, in line with the income effects of off-farm work, earnings from off-farm 
work can release the credit constraints facing farm households and enable them to invest in 
productivity-enhancing inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides or soil-improving inputs such 
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as organic manure and green manure  (Kousar and Abdulai, 2016; Ma et al., 2018b). In this 
case, farm households may choose to expand farm production by renting in more land. 
Nevertheless, the existing literature has failed to provide the evidence regarding the nexus 
between farm couples’ off-farm work participation and household land transfer choices, and 
this study addresses the research gap by applying the econometric approaches discussed in the 
following section. 
3. Empirical strategies 
3.1 Modelling the joint off-farm work decisions of farm couples 
Following previous studies (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Chang et al., 2017), we assume that 
farm couples are making joint decisions when they choose to work off the farm. The off-farm 
work decisions of the husbands and wives are expressed as follows, respectively. 
𝑌1𝑖












∗  and 𝑌2𝑖
∗  are, respectively, latent variables which represent the propensities of the 
husband and his wife to participate in off-farm work, for farm household 𝑖, which cannot be 
observed. What is observed in the data is the off-farm work participation status of the husband 
and his wife, which is indexed by 𝑌1𝑖 or 𝑌2𝑖, respectively. In particular, a value of one is given 
to 𝑌1𝑖 or 𝑌2𝑖 if the husband or his wife worked off the farm, otherwise a zero value is given. As 
discussed in the theoretical framework, the husband or his wife decides to work off the farm if 
the off-farm wage rate is higher than his/her reservation wage. 𝐾1𝑖 and 𝐾2𝑖 refer to the factors 
that affect the off-farm work participation decisions of the husband and his wife, respectively. 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the corresponding parameters to be estimated. The error terms (𝜀1𝑖 , 𝜀1𝑖) follow 















where 𝜌𝜀12 is cross-equation correlation coefficient of the error terms 𝜀1𝑖 and 𝜀2𝑖. Given 
the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, this study employs a seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit (SUBP) model to jointly estimate Equations (12) and (13) and to test the null 
hypothesis that the husband and his wife are making independent decisions when they choose 
to work off the farm. The Wald test is implemented under the null hypothesis that the correlation 
coefficient 𝜌𝜀12 between the error terms in Equations (12) and (13) is equal to zero. Statistical 
significance of 𝜌𝜀12  would indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis and suggest that the 
probability that the husband chose to work off the farm is related to the probability that his wife 
works off the farm through unobserved effects captured in the model’s error terms (Ma et al., 
2018a). For the purpose of SUBP model identification, we follow previous studies and include 
an instrumental variable representing the off-farm work rate of farmers per village as an 
additional regressor in Equation (12) (Che, 2016; Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Ma et al., 2018a).  
The SUBP model estimates the Equation (12) and Equation (13) simultaneously, using a 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach. In particular, the parameters 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 
𝜌𝜀12 can be consistently obtained by estimating the following log-likelihood function (Greene, 
2018): 
𝐿𝑛𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛Φ2[(2𝑌1𝑖 − 1)𝛽1𝐾1𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
, (2𝑌2𝑖 − 1)𝛽2𝐾2𝑖 , (2𝑌1𝑖 − 1)(2𝑌2𝑖 − 1)𝜌𝜀12] (15) 
where Φ2(∙) is the cumulative density function of the bivariate normal distribution. 
3.2 Modelling the impact of off-farm work on land transfer choices 
To examine how off-farm work decisions of farm couples impact on the household land transfer 
choices including (1) no land transfer; (2) renting-in land; and (3) renting-out land, a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model is utilized. Following  Hong et al. (2018), we define a discrete 
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choice variable 𝑚 whose value is 0 for households with no land transfer, 1 for households with 
rented-in land, and 2 for households with rented-out land. Here, an issue that needs to be 
addressed in estimating the impact of off-farm work participation of farm couples on land 
transfer choices is the potential endogeneity issues associated with off-farm work participation 
variables. This is due to the fact that off-farm work is not randomly distributed among farm 
households, but farm couples decide themselves (self-selection) whether or not to participate in 
off-farm work (Imai et al., 2015; Kousar and Abdulai, 2016; Ma et al., 2018b). Failing to control 
for the endogeneity issues of off-farm work variables would result in biased estimates. 
To address the endogenous issues of off-farm work variables, a two stage control function 
method is used (Ma et al., 2018c). In the first stage, we predict the off-farm work variable for 
the husbands and the variable for the wives after simultaneously estimating the Equations (12) 
and (13) using the SUBP model. In the second stage, the predicted off-farm work variables are 
used to estimate the impact of off-farm work decisions of farm couples on land transfer choices. 
Previous studies have shown that the predicted values from the first stage estimation enable to 
help control for the potential endogeneity issues (Chang and Mishra, 2012; Ma et al., 2018c; 
Wooldridge, 2015). After controlling for the endogeneity issues of off-farm work variables, the 
probability 𝑃𝑟(∙) that farm household 𝑖 choose a particular type of land transfer strategy (𝑙𝑡𝑖 =
𝑚) can be modelled as follows (see McFadden, 1987): 
𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑡𝑖 = 𝑚| ?̂?𝑖𝑚
1 , ?̂?𝑖𝑚









, 𝑚 = 0,1,2 (17) 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑚
1  and ?̂?𝑖𝑚
2  are, respectively, the predicted value of off-farm work variable for the 
husbands and that for the wives; 𝑍𝑖𝑚 represents household and farm-level characteristics (e.g., 
age, education, household size, farm size, and soil quality) that affect household land transfer 
choices; 𝛽𝑚1, 𝛽𝑚2 and 𝛽𝑚3 are parameters to be estimated.  
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
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4.1 Data 
The data used in the present study come from a rural household survey that was conducted in 
April 2018 in Hubei province of China. A multistage random sampling procedure with random 
selection of counties, villages and households was employed to select 408 farm households. 
The counties surveyed include Xiantao, Xiaonan, Yingcheng, Hanchuan, Shayang, Jianli and 
Huangpi. Within each county between 2 and 4 villages and then around 15-20 households 
within each village were randomly selected. A structured questionnaire was used to collect 
information from the rural households by well-trained enumerators who spoke the local 
language. The enumerators were hired from the universities of Hubei Province. The survey 
covered information about household and farm-level characteristics (e.g., age, gender, 
education, farm size, and household size), health conditions of household members, off-farm 
work participation status of both husband and wife, cooperative membership status, rural 
transportation condition, and household land transfer choices. 
 In this study we are particularly interested in analyzing the joint off-farm work decisions 
of farm couples and their effects on household land transfer choices. In particular, the husband’s 
off-farm work participation is defined as a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the husband 
participated in off-farm work in 2017, and 0 otherwise. The wife’s off-farm work participation 
variable is defined similarly. Our survey shows that around 21.32% of households have only 
the husbands working off the farm, while 5.39% of them have only the wives working off the 
farm (Figure 1). Land transfer choice is defined as a discrete variable in the present study, which 
gives the value of 0 if a household did not participate in the land rental market (i.e. not 
transferring land), 1 if the household rented in land, and 2 if the household rented out land in 
2017. The final dataset includes a record of 215 households having no land transfer, 143 
households having rented-in land and 50 households having rented-out land. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
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Table 1 presents variable definitions and descriptive statistics. It shows that in 2017, around 27% 
of husbands in our sample have engaged in the off-farm work, while more than 11% of wives 
have participated in off-farm work. The mean ages of the husbands and wives are both 
approximately 60 years, which reflect the aging trend in agricultural production. This is 
consistent with the observation of Horioka et al. (2018). Interestingly, the mean education of 
wives is 4.1 years, which is higher than that of husbands (3.6 years). The health variable refers 
to the self-reported health status of the husband or wife, which is measured by a 5-point ordinal 
scale (from 1=very unhealthy to 5=very healthy). The mean health status of husbands is 3.6 
scores, which is quite familiar to wives’ 3.3, suggesting that both husbands’ and wives’ health 
status are just better than the average health status reported by them in 2017. On average, more 
than 57% of households have children less than 15 years, and around 38% of households have 
a senior member over the age of 65. The average farm is scattered across nine plots and is 15 
mu (1 mu=1/15 hectare) in size. On average, the soil quality of about 65% of the cultivated land 
was identified as being good. 
 Table 2 presents the mean difference of selected variables across the different land transfer 
choices of households. The last two columns in Table 2 report 𝐹 -statistics and the 
corresponding 𝑃-values that examine whether group means of land transfer choices are the 
same. The high 𝐹-statistics and low 𝑃-values indicate that the differences in age of the husband, 
age of the wife, the presence of the senior member, farm size, soil quality, and land 
fragmentation in Table 2 are statistically significant across households with no land transfer, 
housheolds with rented-in land, and the households with rented-out land. There appear to be no 
significant differences in off-farm work particiaption of the husbands and the wives among the 
households with and without land transfer. Howerve, the findings presented in Table 2 are not 
conclusive in explaining the nexus between off-farm work particiaption decisions of farm 
couples and land transfer choices, because the descriptive analysis does not control for 
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confounding factors that may also affect the off-farm work particiaption decisions and land 
transfer choices of farm couples. 
To facilitate our understanding of the relationship between off-farm work participation and 
the land transfer choices of farm couples, we plotted the distribution of husbands and wives’ 
off-farm work participation among different categories of land transfer choices and presented 
the results in Figure 2. The figure shows that there is a noticeable difference in terms of land 
transfer choices and off-farm work participation decisions between husbands and wives. 
Among households not participating in land rental markets, 24.7% of the husbands and 11.6% 
of the wives chose to work off the farm. For households participating in land rental markets, 
the husbands are more likely to work off the farm. The Figure 2 shows that around 30.8% and 
26.0% of husbands in households with rented-in and rented-out land participate in off-farm 
work, respectively, while the same values for the wives are 10.5% and 10.0%. 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Determinants of joint off-farm work decisions 
The estimates for the factors that affect the decisions of husbands and wives to participate in 
off-farm work are presented in Table 3. As indicated earlier, the SUBP model is used to jointly 
estimate Equations (12) and (13). To facilitate interpretation, the estimates for the marginal 
effects of explanatory variables are also calculated and presented in columns 3 and 5 in Table 
3, which are calculated by multiplying the coefficient estimates β̂ by Φ(β̂Ki) at the mean values 
of Ki. 
 It should be noted that maximizing the joint density of the observed dependent variables in 
the SUBP model does not guarantee a good fit (Ma et al., 2018a). Therefore, we employed 
Murphy's (2007) score test to check the misspecification of the SUBP model. In particular, the 
null hypothesis of the Murphy’s score test is that the error terms in Equations (12) and (13) are 
bivariate standard joint normal. The results, which are presented in the lower part of Table 3, 
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show that the P-value of Murphy’s score test is not significantly different from zero at 10% 
level, suggesting that the null hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected. The finding confirms 
the validity of using the SUBP to jointly estimate the off-farm work participation Equation (11) 
for the husbands and Equation (12) for the wives. 
 The results presented in the lower part of Table 3 show that the coefficient of 𝜌𝜀12  is 
significantly different from zero, suggesting the null hypothesis that the husbands and wives 
are making independent off-farm work decisions can be rejected. To put it in another way, the 
probability that a husband chooses to work off the farm is related to the probability that a wife 
chooses to work off the farm through unobserved effects captured in the model’s error terms. 
This evidence justifies the joint estimation of these equations in improving the statistical 
efficiency of the parameter estimates. The positive sign of 𝜌𝜀12 suggests that the husbands and 
wives are making complementary decisions when they choose to work off the farm (Ma et al., 
2018a). 
 The second and third columns present the results for the factors that affect husbands’ 
decision to work off the farm. In particular, the marginal effect of the variable representing the 
husband’s health status is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that healthy husbands 
are 8.0% more likely to participate in off-farm work. Better health conditions make the 
husbands more competitive in labour market. The wife’s education variable is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that an increase in the wife’s education decreases the 
husband’s likelihood of working off the farm. In particular, an additional year of the wives’ 
education will decrease the husband’s probability of working off the farm by 1.3%. This finding 
is in line with the finding of Abdulai and Delgado (1999) who found that additional schooling 
of wives tends to decrease the probability of husbands working off the farm. The marginal effect 
of membership variable is negative and statistically significant, suggesting the husbands in 
households having cooperative membership are 14.0% less likely to participate in off-farm 
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work, a finding this is in line with the finding of Ma and Abdulai (2018). Agricultural 
cooperatives may directly provide information to members through collective actions, while 
allocating more labour to cooperative activities would result in less time being allocated to off-
farm work. Finally, our results show that the marginal effect of the off-farm work rate variable 
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting the existence of village-level peer effects of 
off-farm work participation among males and confirming its validity as an instrumental variable. 
 With respect to the factors that affect wives’ decisions to work off the farm, the age variable 
of husbands has a negative and statistically significant marginal effect. The finding suggests 
that wives living with an elder husband are 1.3% less likely to participate in off-farm work due 
to the necessity of caring for the husband. The variable representing husbands’ education has a 
positive and statistically significant marginal effect, suggesting that wives are 1.1% more likely 
to work off the farm if they live with better-educated husbands. Using data collected from Israeli 
farm households, Kimhi (1994) also showed that an additional year of schooling of the men 
tends to increase the likelihood of women to work off the farm. Better education enables the 
husbands to help their wives identify and process the job vacancy information, which finally 
increases the probability of the wives to work in the off-farm work. 
The negative and statistically significant marginal effect of the children variable suggests 
the presence of children under 15 years in a household decreases the probability of wives to 
work off the farm. These findings are consistent with the findings in previous studies (Matshe 
and Young, 2004; Qiao and Yao, 2015). For example,  Qiao et al. (2015) found that women are 
still the primary care provider for children in rural China, thus having school-aged children 
decreases the likelihood of wives’ working off-farm. Farm size appears to be an important 
determinant of the wives’ off-farm work decision. The negative and statistically significant 
marginal effect of farm size variable in the last column of Table 3 suggests that increasing farm 
size reduces the likelihood of working off the farms among wives. The findings are consistent 
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with Abdulai and Delgado (1999) who found that farm size has a negative effect on wives’ off-
farm labor supply. In rural regions, men are more likely to migrate than women for the sake of 
better income opportunities, while women are usually left responsible for managing the family 
farms. Thus, the wives are less likely to work off the farm if they are living in households with 
large farm size.  
 Finally, for the purpose of comparison, the farm couples’ off-farm work decisions were 
also estimated by relaxing the “ad hoc” assumption of the joint error terms using a more flexible 
semi-nonparametric seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SNP-SUBP) method (Luca, 2010). 
The results, which are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix, show that the additional 
parameters of the polynomial order (𝑟) are not statistically significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that the probability function 𝐹(∙) degenerates to the standard normal probability 
function Φ(∙)  and thus confirm the validity of using the SUBP model. The results of the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test under the null hypothesis that the SUBP model is statistically equal 
to the SNP-SUBP is 15.61. The P-value = 0.926 suggests that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, which further confirms the validity of using the SUBP model to estimate the joint 
off-farm work decisions of farm couples. 
5.2 Impacts of the couple’s off-farm work on land transfer choices 
The results for the impact of off-farm work participation of both husbands and wives on land 
transfer choices are presented in Table 4, which are estimated using a MNL model. As discussed 
previously, the predicted values for off-farm work participation of husbands and off-farm work 
participation of wives, which account for issues of endogeneity, are used in the estimations. 
Given that the coefficients estimated by the MNL model are not interpreted directly, we, 
therefore, calculate the marginal effects of the exoplanetary variables to provide a better 
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understanding of the magnitudes of the coefficients (Greene, 2018).2 
 The results in Table 4 provide evidence that off-farm work decisions of farm couples are 
two important factors that determine household land transfer choices, but they affect household 
land transfer choices differently. The statistically significant marginal effects of off-farm work 
for the husbands and wives in the no transfer specification (second column of Table 4) suggest 
that husbands working off the farm are 14.4% less likely to maintain the current land area, while 
the wives working off the farm are 42.1% more likely to do so. With respect to renting in land, 
our estimates show that husbands working off the farm are 7.5% more likely to rent in land, 
while off-farm work participation of the wives has a negative and statistically significant impact 
on the probability of choosing to rent in land.  Previous studies have analyzed the impact of off-
farm work participation on the choice of renting in land, but the results remain mixed (Che, 
2016; Deininger and Jin, 2008; Huang et al., 2012; Min et al., 2017; Yan and Huo, 2016). For 
example, Yan and Huo (2016) showed that off-farm work participation has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the probability of renting in land in China, while Min et al. 
(2017) found that off-farm work participation has a positive impact on the probability of renting 
in land in China. 
The results presented in the last column of Table 4 show that the households are more likely 
to rent out land if both husbands and wives work off the farm. The findings suggest that 
allocating more labor to off-farm work results in less labor being allocated to farm work. In 
order to maintain or enhance agricultural productivity, households choose to reduce the 
cultivated land area by renting out land, a finding that is in line with the lost-labor effects of 
off-farm work and consistent with the findings in previous studies (Che, 2016; Huang et al., 
2012; Yan and Huo, 2016). The findings suggest there exists the presence of gender differences 
in choosing land transfer strategies and confirm the necessity of analyzing the effects of joint 
                                                            
2 The results of the coefficients estimated by MNL are presented in Table A2 in Appendix. 
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off-farm work decisions of both husbands and wives on land transfer choices. 
 Other variables also show significant impacts on household land transfer choices. The 
positive and statistically significant marginal effect of age for husbands suggests that elder 
husbands are 2.6% more likely to rent out land. The elder husbands are usually in unfavorable 
physical conditions and thus have less incentives to engage in agricultural production.  
Education of husbands appears to be an important determinant of land rental market 
participation. The positive and significant marginal effect of the education variable for 
husbands in the rented-in specification and the negative and significant marginal effect of the 
variable in the rented-out specification suggest that husbands with better education are 4.8% 
more likely to rent in land but 2.8% less likely to rent out land. Better education enables 
husbands to identify and process information used for agricultural production and marketing, 
which finally motivates the husbands to enlarge the cultivated area through use of the rental 
market. 
 The age of wives has a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of 
renting in land. Age can be seen as a proxy of farmers’ experience and managerial ability. It is 
possible that experienced wives have an advantage in managing agricultural production and 
thus choose to rent in more land for the sake of scale-of-operation. The presence of children 
under 15 years has a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of choosing 
to maintain the land area but affects the likelihood of renting in land negatively. Households 
with children usually have to trade-off the time used for child care and agricultural production. 
More time used for taking care of the children would result in less time used for agricultural 
production, and in this case, households are less likely to rent in land but choose to maintain 
the current cultivated land area. 
The positive and statistically significant marginal effect of the transportation variable in 
the rented-in specification suggests that the probability of renting in land by households 
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increases if the transportation from the village to the train/bus station is convenient. Convenient 
transportation enables farm households to transport the productivity-enhancing inputs (e.g., 
fertilizers and pesticides) or agricultural products from or to the markets, which reduces the 
transaction costs of agricultural production and marketing. The marginal effect of the 
membership variable is positive and statistically significant in the rented-in specification. 
Agricultural cooperatives are widely regarded as an important institutional innovation that can 
help overcome the constraints that impede smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and output 
markets, as well as enhance farm economic performance (Ma et al., 2018a; Ma and Abdulai, 
2018). As a result, households with cooperative membership are more likely to enlarge the farm 
size by renting in more land in order to benefit from agricultural production with the help of 
cooperatives. 
Soil quality also appears to be an important factor determining land rental market 
participation of rural households. Our results show that households cultivating fertile land are 
8.1% more likely to rent out land but 11.4% less likely to rent in land. The plausible reason is 
that fertile land is more preferred in land rental markets, and the land with fertile soil can usually 
be rented out at a reasonably high price. The marginal effects of land fragmentation variable in 
the no transfer and rented-in specifications (second and third columns of Table 4) are -0.026 
and 0.028, respectively, which are statistically significant at the 1% level. The findings suggest 
that fragmentation increases the probability of renting in land. Tan et al. (2008) showed that 
farmers with more and smaller plots tend to use more labor and fewer modern technologies as 
compared to farmers with fewer and larger plots. Thus, it is likely that households choose to 
rent in land with larger plots in order to adopt modern technologies (e.g., farm machines) and 
save farm labor. 
 Finally, we predicted the probabilities of land transfer choices by grouping off-farm work 
decisions of farm couples, including (1) both the husbands and the wives working off the farm; 
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(2) only the husbands working off the farm; (3) only the wives working off the farm; and (4) 
neither the husbands nor the wives working off the farm. The results, which are presented in 
Table 5, show that households with only the wives working off the farm have the highest 
probability (0.58) of not participating in the land rental market. In comparison, the households 
with only the husbands working off the farm have the highest probability (0.39) of renting in 
land, while households with both the husbands and wives working off the farm have the highest 
probability (0.16) of renting out land. 
6. Conclusions  
Off-farm work has important implications for diversifying rural incomes and enhancing 
sustainable rural development in many developing and emerging countries. Although previous 
studies have widely investigated the determinants and wide impacts of the off-farm work 
participation decision of household heads, there has so far been no attempt to examine the nexus 
between farm couples’ off-farm work participation and land transfer choices. To bridge this 
gap, we used farm-level data collected from Hubei province of China and analyzed the factors 
that affect farm couples’ decisions to work off-farm, using a seemingly unrelated bivariate 
probit model. We also estimated the impacts of the joint off-farm work decisions of the farm 
couples on household land transfer choices, using a multinomial logit model. 
The empirical results showed that rural husbands and wives are jointly making decisions 
to work off the farm.  In particular, we found that health status of the husband, education of the 
wife and cooperative membership are main factors that determine a husband’s decision to work 
off the farm, while the wife’s off-farm work participation decision is mainly affected by the 
husband’s age and education, the presence of children and farm size. 
Given the existence of interdependence the decision to work off-farm of the husband and 
the wife, we estimated the impact of the joint decisions of off-farm work participation of the 
farm couples on household land transfer choices. The results showed that off-farm work 
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participation of farm couples affects land transfer choices differently. In particular, the 
husbands working off the farm were more likely to participate in land rental markets by either 
renting in or renting out land relative to their counterparts who did not work off the farm. The 
wives working off the farm were more likely to rent out land but less likely to rent in land 
compared with their counterparts who did not work off the farm. In addition, we found that the 
households’ decision to rent in land is positively affected by the education of the husband, the 
presence of a senior member in the household, transportation, and cooperative membership, 
while their decision to rent out land is positively influenced by the age of the husband, farm 
size and soil quality. 
 Our findings have important policy implications for enhancing off-farm work participation 
of rural households and fostering land rental markets. The significant impacts of farm couples’ 
off-farm work participation on land transfer choices highlight the importance of public policies 
in reducing the constraints that restrict off-farm work participation of rural households and 
increasing off-farm work opportunities, with the aim of stimulating the development of rural 
land rental markets.  The results that transportation and cooperative membership have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on land renting-in decision suggest that improving the rural 
infrastructure such as road and encouraging farmers to join agricultural cooperatives may 
facilitate rural households to enlarge cultivation area by renting in land and benefit from the 
increasing economies of scale. 
 A limitation of this study is that we only focus on rural households in Hubei province of 
China, without taking into account farm couples’ off-farm work decisions and land transfer 
choices of farm households in other regions. Given the importance of off-farm work 
participation in improving rural household welfare and enhancing sustainable rural 
development, further research on other regions may improve our understanding of the nexus 
between off-farm work decisions of farm couples and land transfer choices in a broader context. 
23 
Given we only focus on land transfer choices of rural households, it could be a promising area 
for future work to investigate how farm couples’ off-farm work decisions affect land transfer 
intensity (i.e. the amount of land transferred) in rural regions. 
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Table 1 The descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables Definition Mean Std. Dev.b 
Land transfer choices 
0 if has no land transfer; 1 if household rented in 









1 if wife participated in off-farm in 2017, 0 
otherwise 
0.11 0.31 
Age (Husband) Age of husband (years) 60.68 8.99 
Education 
(Husbands) 
Years of schooling of husband (years) 3.62 2.47 
Health (Husband) 
Self-reported health status of the husband (from 
1=very unhealthy to 5=very healthy) 
3.47 1.01 
Age (Wife) Age of wife in years 59.02 9.08 
Education (Wife) Years of schooling of wife (years) 4.06 3.49 
Health (Wife) 
Self-reported health status of the wife (from 
1=very unhealthy to 5=very healthy) 
3.29 0.99 
Household size Number of members residency in a household 5.42 2.39 
Children 








1 if transportation from the village to the train/ bus 
station is convenient, 0 otherwise 
0.78 0.42 
Membership 
1 if household has cooperative membership, 0 
otherwise 
0.10 0.29 
Farm size Total farm size (mu)a 14.93 12.70 
Soil quality 1 if soil is fertile, 0 otherwise 0.65 0.48 
Fragmentation The number of land plots 8.72 7.99 
Note: a 1 mu = 0.067 hectare; 
b Std. Dev. =standard deviation. 
30 
Table 2 The descriptive statistics of the variables by land transfer choices 
Variables No transfer Rented-in Rented-out F-value Prob>F 
Off-farm work (Husband) 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.83 0.44 
Off-farm work (Wife) 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.92 
Age (Husband) 61.32 58.88 63.10 5.33 0.01 
Education (Husband) 3.63 3.71 3.28 0.56 0.57 
Health (Husband) 3.47 3.52 3.34 0.58 0.56 
Age (Wife) 59.28 57.66 61.76 4.04 0.02 
Education (Wife) 4.14 3.91 4.16 0.21 0.81 
Health (Wife) 3.27 3.32 3.30 0.12 0.89 
Household size 5.53 5.36 5.14 0.59 0.55 
Children 0.60 0.56 0.48 1.25 0.29 
Senior member 0.42 0.29 0.44 3.93 0.02 
Transportation 0.77 0.77 0.84 0.61 0.55 
Membership 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.79 
Farm size 10.75 20.99 15.63 32.30 0.00 
Soil quality 0.68 0.52 0.82 8.89 0.00 
Fragmentation 6.49 12.43 7.70 27.27 0.00 
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Table 3 Modeling the joint decision of farm couples in off-farm work participation: SUBP model 
estimation 
Variables 
Husbands  Wives 
Coefficients Marginal effects  Coefficients Marginal effects 
Age (Husbands) -0.032 (0.033) -0.008 (0.009)  -0.091 (0.046)** -0.013 (0.006)** 
Education 
(Husbands) 
0.041 (0.038) 0.011 (0.010)  0.075 (0.047)* 0.011 (0.007)* 
Health (Husbands) 0.307 (0.091)*** 0.080 (0.022)***  0.006 (0.097) 0.001 (0.014) 
Age (Wives) -0.009 (0.032) -0.002 (0.008)  0.027 (0.045) 0.004 (0.007) 
Education (Wives) -0.051 (0.026)** -0.013 (0.007)**  0.033 (0.034) 0.005 (0.005) 
Health (Wives) 0.012 (0.083) 0.003 (0.022)  -0.072 (0.112) -0.011 (0.016) 
Household size 0.034 (0.031) 0.009 (0.008)  -0.012 (0.049) -0.002 (0.007) 
Children -0.030 (0.157) -0.008 (0.041)  -0.647 (0.222)*** -0.096 (0.033)*** 
Senior member 0.011 (0.216) 0.003 (0.056)  0.328 (0.269) 0.049 (0.040) 
Transportation 0.041 (0.177) 0.011 (0.046)  0.151 (0.316) 0.022 (0.046) 
Membership -0.535 (0.197)*** -0.140 (0.051)***  0.218 (0.243) 0.032 (0.036) 
Farm size 0.000 (0.007) 0.000 (0.002)  -0.028 (0.010)*** -0.004 (0.001)*** 
Soil quality 0.092 (0.163) 0.024 (0.043)  -0.098 (0.299) -0.014 (0.044) 
Fragmentation -0.003 (0.010) -0.001 (0.003)  0.019 (0.018) 0.003 (0.003) 
Husbands’ off-farm 
work rate (per 
village) 
3.115 (0.510)*** 0.812 (0.117)***    
Constant -0.206 (0.672)   3.105 (1.167)***  
Regional effects YES 
Cluster effects YES 
Log pseudolikelihood ratio -294.379 
𝜌𝜀12  0.447 (0.139)
 *** 
Wald test Chi2 (1) =12.020   P = 0.001 
Murphy’s score test Chi2 (9) =9.59  P = 0.3847 
Observations 408 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 Margin impacts of off-farm work on household land use strategies 
Variables 
No transfer Rented-in Rented-out 
Margin effects Margin effects Margin effects 
Off-farm work (Husband) -0.144 (0.041)*** 0.075 (0.044)* 0.069 (0.038)* 
Off-farm work (Wife) 0.421 (0.183)** -0.703 (0.102)*** 0.281 (0.169)* 
Age (Husband) 0.051 (0.019)*** -0.077 (0.011)*** 0.026 (0.015)* 
Education (Husband) -0.020 (0.018) 0.048 (0.010)*** -0.028 (0.016)* 
Health (Husband) 0.098 (0.029)*** -0.065 (0.023)*** -0.034 (0.022) 
Age (Wife) -0.032 (0.011)*** 0.031 (0.008)*** 0.001 (0.008) 
Education (Wife) -0.013 (0.013) 0.013 (0.009) 0.000 (0.010) 
Health (Wife) 0.014 (0.034) -0.054 (0.030)* 0.040 (0.030) 
Household size 0.012 (0.011) -0.006 (0.010) -0.006 (0.005) 
Children 0.335 (0.130)** -0.499 (0.087)*** 0.163 (0.112) 
Senior member -0.050 (0.086) 0.152 (0.055)*** -0.102 (0.080) 
Transportation -0.071 (0.050) 0.094 (0.047)** -0.023 (0.050) 
Membership -0.194 (0.087)** 0.219 (0.071)*** -0.025 (0.065) 
Farm size -0.006 (0.008) -0.006 (0.005) 0.011 (0.005)** 
Soil quality 0.033 (0.055) -0.114 (0.040)*** 0.081 (0.043)* 
Fragmentation -0.026 (0.008)*** 0.028 (0.005)*** -0.003 (0.005) 
McFadden R2  0.263 
Log-likelihood ration -289.295 
Observations 408 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5 The average probability of land transfer choices by farm couples’ off-farm work 
status 
Land transfer choices No transfer Rented-in Rented-out 
Husband only 0.53 (0.26) 0.39 (0.28) 0.09 (0.09) 
Wife only 0.58 (0.27) 0.30 (0.28) 0.13 (0.11) 
Both 0.49 (0.24) 0.35 (0.27) 0.16 (0.14) 
Neither 0.53 (0.26) 0.34 (0.28) 0.13 (0.14) 




Table A1 Modeling the joint decision of farm couples in off-farm work participation: SNP-
SUBP model estimation 
Variables 
Husbands  Wives 
Coefficients z-value  Coefficients z-value 
Age (Husband) -0.038 (0.041) -0.920  -0.064 (0.040) -1.617 
Education (Husband) 0.086 (0.042)** 2.060  0.079 (0.035)** 2.249 
Health (Husband) 0.565 (0.147)*** 3.835  0.027 (0.104) 0.258 
Age (Wife) -0.028 (0.041) -0.677  0.023 (0.039) 0.594 
Education (Wife) -0.099 (0.033)*** -3.054  0.041 (0.028) 1.466 
Health (Wife) 0.022 (0.159) 0.138  -0.039 (0.107) -0.364 
Household size 0.093 (0.062) 1.494  -0.001 (0.056) -0.014 
Children -0.741 (0.280)*** -2.644  -0.596 (0.236)** -2.522 
Senior member -0.105 (0.254) -0.412  0.259 (0.198) 1.314 
Transportation 0.209 (0.250) 0.833  0.166 (0.206) 0.808 
Membership -0.770 (0.408)* -1.888  0.167 (0.308) 0.544 
Farm size 0.003 (0.010) 0.333  -0.024 (0.011)** -2.306 
Soil quality 0.230 (0.231) 0.994  -0.029 (0.203) -0.143 
Fragmentation -0.007 (0.015) -0.466  0.018 (0.016) 1.128 
Husbands off-farm work rate 
(per village) 
5.806 (0.984)*** 5.902    
Regional effects YES 
r11 137,715.651 (5,421,722.578) 
r12 597,83.645 (2,353,845.298) 
r13 -8,572.285 (338,114.153) 
r21 33,692.095 (1,326,531.548) 
r22 14,701.358 (579,410.075) 
r23 -1,247.987 (49,643.684) 
r31 -46,712.425 (1,838,975.789) 
r32 -12,744.815 (501,999.796) 
r33 6,044.767 (238,010.598) 
Log pseudolikelihood -286.311 
𝜌𝜀12 0.217 
Observations 408 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A2 The impacts of off-farm work on household land transfer choices 
Variables 
Rented-in  Rented-out 
Coefficients z-value  Coefficients z-value 
Off-farm work (Husband) 0.685 (0.278)** 2.463  0.968 (0.410)** 2.363 
Off-farm work (Wife) -4.377 (0.686)*** -6.385  1.713 (1.939)  0.884 
Age (Husband) -0.491 (0.080)*** -6.161  0.127 (0.180) 0.709 
Education (Husband) 0.279 (0.077)*** 3.600  -0.218 (0.180) -1.211 
Health (Husband) -0.534 (0.164)*** -3.253  -0.535 (0.253)** -2.115 
Age (Wife) 0.222 (0.055)*** 4.031  0.081 (0.096) 0.846 
Education (Wife) 0.093 (0.065) 1.428  0.034 (0.120) 0.282 
Health (Wife) -0.293 (0.196) -1.494  0.345 (0.318) 1.082 
Household size -0.054 (0.074) -0.729  -0.086 (0.066) -1.308 
Children -3.186 (0.580)*** -5.497  0.791 (1.289) 0.613 
Senior member 0.855 (0.388)** 2.202  -0.849 (0.930) -0.913 
Transportation 0.617 (0.292)** 2.117  -0.059 (0.540) -0.110 
Membership 1.503 (0.480)*** 3.130  0.197 (0.755) 0.261 
Farm size -0.017 (0.040) -0.417  0.120 (0.064)* 1.867 
Soil quality -0.634 (0.281)** -2.259  0.691 (0.533) 1.297 
Fragmentation 0.196 (0.042)*** 4.646  0.029 (0.060) 0.491 
Constant 12.273 (2.191)*** 5.601  -12.345 (5.660)** -2.181 
Regional effects YES 
Cluster effects YES 
McFadden R2  0.263 
Log-likelihood ration -289.295 
Observations 408 
The reference group is no rent; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
 
